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CRIMINAL LAW
ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO COMPEL TELEPHONE COMPANY TO INSTALL PEN
REGISTER
In re Pen Register
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968' was enacted by Congress to remedy the unsatisfactory state
of the law concerning electronic surveillance.2 Unlike a majority of
the other instruments used for electronic surveillance, the pen regis-
ter, a device which records all numbers dialed on a particular tele-
phone without monitoring the contents of the call,3 has been held
1 18 U.S. §§ 2510-2520 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). For a brief discussion of the law in this
area prior to Title Ill, see 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 665 (1969).
2 S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1968), reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2154. Title III was designed by Congress to accomplish the dual purpose of
"protecting the privacy of wire and oral communications" and providing a comprehensive
statutory framework within which electronic surveillance may lawfully be conducted." Id. at
66 (1968), reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2153. In order to effecutate this
purpose, the Senate Report stated, the Act "prohibits all wiretapping and electronic surveil-
lance by persons other than duly authorized law enforcement officers engaged in the investi-
gation or prevention of specified types of serious crimes, and only after authorization of a
court order obtained after a showing and finding of probable cause." Id. Although the Su-
preme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality of any of the provisions of Title I, every
circuit court that has construed the statute has declared it constitutional. See, e.g., United
States v. Ramsey, 503 F.2d 524, 531 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 932 (1974); United
States v. Martinez, 498 F.2d 464, 468 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974); United
States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 773-75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973); United
States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 909 (1975); United
States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489, 501 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974); United
States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1304 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974); United
States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679, 687 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 934 (1972).
See, e.g., United States v. Caplan, 255 F. Supp. 805, 807 (E.D. Mich. 1966). In United
States v. Guglielmo, 245 F. Supp. 534, 535 (N.D. Ill. 1965), affd sub nom. United States v.
Dote, 371 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1966), the court, in describing the pen register, stated:
The pen register is a mechanical device attached on occasion to a given telephone
line, usually at central telephone offices. A pulsation of the dial on a line to which
the pen register is attached records on a paper tape dashes equal to the number
dialed. The paper tape then becomes a permanent and complete record of outgoing
calls as well as the numbers called on the particular line. Immediately after the
number is dialed and before the line called has had an opportunity to answer
(actually the pen register has no way of determining or recording whether or not
the calls are answered) the pen register mechanically and automatically is discon-
nected. There is neither recording nor monitoring of the conversation.
245 F. Supp. at 535. See generally Higgins, Warrants Upon Warrants: The Pen Register and
Probable Cause Under Omnibus Crime Control, 60 J. CRai. L.C. & P.S. 455 (1969); Note,
The Legal Constraints Upon the Use of the Pen Register as a Law Enforcement Tool, 60
CORNELL L. REV. 1028 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Legal Constraints].
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to be outside the parameters of Title III. 4 Thus, in the absence of
statutory guidance, several critical issues relating to the utilization
of the pen register have been left to judicial resolution. Recently, in
In re Pen Register,5 the Second Circuit, faced with its first opportun-
ity to examine these issues, held that a district court may properly
authorize the use of a pen register.' More importantly, the court
concluded that absent express statutory authorization, issuance of
an order directing a telephone company to furnish technical assist-
ance to the government in the installation of the device constitutes
an abuse of discretion.7
The In re Pen Register controversy began on March 19, 1976,
when the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York issued an order authorizing Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (FBI) agents investigating an alleged organized gambling oper-
ation to install a pen register device on certain telephones. The order
also directed the New York Telephone Co. to furnish the agents with
all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to in-
stall the instrument. The telephone company refused to furnish the
Title III defines interception as "the aural acquisition of the contents of any wire or
oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device." 18
U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1970). "Aural" has been defined as "of or related to the sense of hearing."
WEBSTERS INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 144 (3d ed. 1971). Since the pen register does not detect
sound, but merely records electronic impulses, courts have held that it does not intercept a
communication within the statutory definition. See, e.g., United States v. Illinois Bell Tel.
Co., 531 F.2d 809, 811 & n.3 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 478, 482 (3d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975); United States v. Finn, 502 F.2d 938, 942 (7th
Cir. 1974); United States v. Best, 363 F. Supp. 11, 17 (S.D. Ga. 1973). Recent decisions
indicate, however, that where a pen register is used in conjunction with a court ordered
wiretap, the Title III order is broad enough to provide sufficient authorization for both. See,
e.g., United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 478, 482 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955
(1975); United States v. Brick, 502 F.2d 219, 223-24 (8th Cir. 1974); Application of the United
States for a Pen Register, 407 F. Supp. 398, 402 (W.D. Mo. 1976); United States v. Lanza,
341 F. Supp. 405, 422 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
5 538 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1976), afj'g in part and rev'g in part 416 F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y.)
(mem.), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3508 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1977) (No. 76-835).
6 538 F.2d at 960.
Id. at 961. When Title III was first enacted, it did not contain any provision regarding
a district court's power to compel a communications common carrier to furnish technical
assistance to the government in installing an eavesdropping device. Often, however, a valid
wiretap order could be frustrated by a communications common carrier who refused to aid
the government. To remedy this situation, Congress amended Title Inl to provide a district
court with the power to order such assistance. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1970) (amending 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518 (Supp. IV 1969)). Congress simultaneously amended § 2520 to provide that "[a] good
faith reliance on a court order or legislative authorization shall constitute a complete defense
to any civil or criminal action brought under this chapter or under any other law." 18 U.S.C.
§ 2520 (1970) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (Supp. IV 1969)).
1 Order Authorizing Use of a Pen Register, Misc. No. 19-97(44) (S.D.N.Y. March 19,
1976) (sealed order). This order was one of a series issued by the district court pursuant to
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requisite telephone lease lines, asserting that company regulations
prohibited such assistance absent a Title Ill order.9 On March 30,
1976, the telephone company moved to vacate or modify the district
court order. This motion was denied by the district court."
On appeal," the Second Circuit was confronted with two issues.
Initially, the court had to decide the threshold question whether a
district court possesses the power to authorize use of a pen register. 2
The second and more vexing problem facing the court was whether
a district court has the power to order the telephone company to aid
in the installation and operation of the device, and, if so, whether
it is appropriate to exercise that power in the absence of specific
statutory authorization. 3
Judge Medina, writing for the court, 4 relied on both the legisla-
an ongoing investigation by the government. Previously, the government had obtained a Title
III wiretap order, accompanied by a pen register order, for another telephone. The telephone
company had provided the technical assistance, including lease lines, requested by the prior
orders. Brief for the United States at 2 n.1.
538 F.2d at 957-58.
'0 416 F. Supp. at 801. Judge Tenney determined that pen registers were not subject to
the strictures of Title EIl. Their use, he concluded, depends entirely on compliance with the
requirements of the fourth amendment. Id. at 802-03. Having so decided, Judge Tenney next
addressed the issue whether the court possessed the authority to compel the telephone com-
pany to assist the government in installing the pen register. Adopting the reasoning of the
Seventh Circuit in United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1976), a case
indistinguishable from the one at bar, Judge Tenney held that the court possessed either the
inherent power or statutory authority under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970), to
order telephone company assistance. 416 F. Supp. at 803-04.
1 After the district court had denied the motion to vacate, the telephone company
petitioned the Second Circuit, requesting a stay of both district court orders. On April 8, the
Second Circuit denied the motion for a stay and ordered an expedited appeal. 538 F.2d at
958. On April 9, the original order, which had expired, was extended for an additional 20 days
to ensure that the issue was ripe for appeal. Both parties agreed that this was an important
question of law that should "not be mooted by expiration of the original order." Brief for
Appellant at 2.
In Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 541 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1976), the Fifth
Circuit was confronted with the propriety of a district court order directing the telephone
company to assist the government in installation of a pen register, Since the telephone
company had complied with the order prior to oral argument, however, the Fifth Circuit
declined to hear the case, concluding that the issue was moot. The court did take cognizance
of the precarious position of the telephone company-"damned by potential civil liability if
it does comply with the District Court order and damned by a possible contempt citation if
it does not." Id. at 1156. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit strongly urged that in future cases the
district court consider a stay to permit review on an expedited basis. Id.
12 538 F.2d at 958.
'3 Id. The court felt this second issue to be of major importance "because of its broader
implications regarding the power of a federal court to mandate law enforcement assistance
by private citizens and corporations under the threat of the contempt sanction." Id. at 960.
" The Second Circuit panel consisted of Judges Medina, Feinberg, and Mansfield. Judge
Mansfield filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
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tive history of Title ]1J' 5 and the statutory definition of the word
intercept'6 to first determine that pen register orders were not within
the purview of the statute.'7 He also noted that in enacting Title II,
Congress expressly amended section 605 of the Federal Communica-
tions Act,'8 which had previously applied "to the interception and
disclosure of 'any communication,' including pen registers."' 9 As a
result, the court stated, this section is now restricted in scope to
radio communications, and therefore is also inapplicable to the
order in question. 0 The parties, however, drew differing conclusions
from this absence of statutory coverage. The telephone company
contended that absent statutory authorization, an order authorizing
the installation or use of a pen register may not properly be issued.
The government, on the other hand, asserted that the district court
possesses either "inherent authority or power under Rule 41 [of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure], to issue such an order, sub-
538 F.2d at 958. Judge Medina viewed the legislative history of Title III as evidencing
congressional intent to exclude pen registers from the scope of Title Im. The portion of the
Senate Report on which Judge Medina relied states:
Paragraph (4) defines "intercept" to include the aural acquisition of the contents
of any wire or oral communication by any electronic, mechanical, or other device.
Other forms of surveillance are not within the proposed legislation. . . .The pro-
posed legislation is not designed to prevent the tracing of phone calls. The use of a
"pen register," for example, would be permissible. . . .The proposed legislation
is intended to protect the privacy of the communication itself and not the means
of communication.
S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 90 (1968), reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2178.
,B 538 F.2d at 958. See note 4 supra.
" 538 F.2d at 958.
IS Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 803, 82 Stat. 223 (amending 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964)). The effect
of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 was to make all electronic surveillance illegal.
See Note, The Statutory Requirements for Wiretap Application Made Clear - United States
v. Giordano, 24 DEPAUL L. REV. 227, 230 (1974); Note, Electronic Eavesdropping: A Victim's
Primer, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 162, 171 (1973). Prior to the enactment of Title II, it was
thought that section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat.
1103 (1934) (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970)), which prohibited the interception and
divulgence of any communication without the consent of the sender, barred the use of the
pen register. See, e.g., United States v. Dote, 371 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1966); United States v.
Caplan, 255 F. Supp. 805, 807 (E.D. Mich. 1966). In enacting Title I, Congress amended
section 605, restricting its applicability to radio communications and leaving wire and oral
communications entirely within the scope of Title III. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 107 (1968), reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 2196. It has generally
been accepted that this amendment has taken pen registers out of the purview of § 605.
See, e.g., United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 478, 482 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
955 (1975); United States v. Brick, 502 F.2d 219, 223 (8th Cir. 1974); Korman v. United
States, 486 F.2d 926, 932 (7th Cir. 1973).
" 538 F.2d at 959.
20 Id.; see note 18 supra.
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ject only to the restraints of the Fourth Amendment." 21
Judge Medina, relying upon a recent comment by Justice Pow-
ell, stated that a "pen register order involves a search and seizure
under the Fourth Amendment, and. . . a court may issue such an
order only upon a showing of probable cause. '22 The power to issue
a pen register order, the Second Circuit concluded, is either a
"logical derivative" of the power to order a search and seizure of
tangible property under rule 41,23 or within the inherent authority
of the judiciary.24 Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's
decision authorizing the use and installation of the pen register by
the FBI.2
The Second Circuit next addressed the issue whether the court
below was correct in directing the telephone company to assist the
FBI agents in their operation of the pen register. While conceding
the absence of express statutory authorization, the government as-
serted "that the federal courts have either inherent authority or
power under the All Writs Act" 2 to compel a communications car-
22 538 F.2d at 959.
Id., quoting, United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974). Justice Powell stated:
Because a pen register device is not subject to the provisions of Title HI, the
permissibility of its use by law enforcement authorities depends entirely on compli-
ance with the constitutional requirements of the Fourth Amendment. In this case
the Government secured a court order, the equivalent for this purpose of a search
warrant, for each of the two extensions of its authorization to use a pen register.
Id. at 553-54 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
Notwithstanding the seemingly clear mandate enunciated by Justice Powell, his statement
is not dispositive of this issue. First, this comment was made in a dissenting opinion. Addi-
tionally, in the omitted footnote, Justice Powell responded to the government's contention
that pen register surveillance did not constitute a search within the fourth amendment by
remarking that he was not compelled to address this issue, for in his view the constitutional
requirements, if applicable, were satisfied by the government. Id. at 554 n.4.
2 538 F.2d at 960. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 authorizes the search and seizure of property by
law enforcement officials under prescribed circumstances. For a warrant to be issued, there
must be an antecedent judicial determination of probable cause. Id. 41(c). Additionally, the
property to be seized must constitute either evidence of the commission of a crime, "the fruits
of crime," or property used in the commission of a crime. Id. 41(b). The term property as
used in this rule includes "documents, books, papers and any other tangible objects." Id.
41(h). Although rule 41 apparently was not written with the seizure of intangible objects in
mind, the government usually requests and receives an order under rule 41 when desiring to
use a pen register. See 1 NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS
RELATING TO WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, HEARINGS 44 (1976) (statements of
Henry E. Petersen, Assistant Attorney General, Sept. 16, 1974) [hereinafter cited as NWC
HEARINGS]; id. at 742-43 (statements of Alwin C. Coward, Special Agent, Drug Enforcement
Administration, May 19, 1975); id. at 744 (statements of William Lenck, Assistant Chief
Counsel, Drug Enforcement Administration, May 19, 1975).
2, 538 F.2d at 960.
2Id.
25 Id. at 961. The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1970), provides: "[T]he Supreme
1977]
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rier to furnish assistance in installing a pen register." Essentially,
the All Writs Act authorizes a court, once jurisdiction has attached
on some independent basis, "to enter such orders as may be neces-
sary to effectuate their lawful decrees. ' 28 Assuming, arguendo, that
the All Writs Act confers the requisite power on the courts, the
Second Circuit, after a careful balancing of the equities, neverthe-
less concluded that "in the absence of specific and properly limited
Congressional action, it was an abuse of discretion for the District
Court to order the Telephone Company to furnish technical assist-
ance. 19 Fearful of initiating a trend in the federal courts whereby
Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropri-
ate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."
Once jurisdiction has attached on some independent ground, the Act permits the judiciary,
in its discretion, to issue all writs and orders necessary to prevent interference with a court's
lawful directives. See, e.g., Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 273 (1942)
(predecessor statute to § 1651); Bullock v. United States, 265 F.2d 683, 691 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 360 U.S. 909 (1959); Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 273 F. Supp.
1 (E.D. Mo. 1967) (mem.), aff'd sub nor. Osbourne v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co.,
389 U.S. 579 (1968) (per curiam); United States v. Wallace, 218 F. Supp. 290, 292 (N.D. Ala.
1963). In In re Pen Register, the government argued that a telephone company's refusal to
provide assistance renders the court order authorizing the pen register worthless. Therefore,
the government contended, the district court should be able to issue an auxiliary order under
the All Writs Act directing the company to cooperate. Brief for the United States at 10-11.
27 538 F.2d at 961.
United States v. Wallace, 218 F. Supp. 290, 292 (N.D. Ala. 1963). See note 26 supra.
538 F.2d at 961. The In re Pen Register court noted that the determination whether to
issue an order directing telephone company assistance was a discretionary matter for the
district court. Id. Those considerations which, in the Second Circuit's view, supported issu-
ance of the order included: the fact that the federal agents could not institute pen register
surveillance without assistance; the fact that the requisite assistance was a relatively simple
procedure, requiring little time or effort on the part of the telephone company; the belief that
the assistance could be given without fear of civil or criminal liability; the concern that failure
to act might have a detrimental effect on law enforcement in general; and, the belief that
failure to issue the order would severely hamper the particular investigation at issue. Id. at
961-62.
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit ruled that stronger factors militated against issuance
of such an order. First, Judge Medina asserted that since "Congressional authority was
thought to be necessary in Title III cases, . . . similar authorization should be required in
connection with pen register orders .... " Id. at 962. More importantly, he expressed his
concern that issuance of such an order, without specific congressional authorization, could
establish a "precedent for the authority of federal courts to impress unwilling aid on private
third parties." Id. In conclusion, the In re Pen Register court stated:
While the Congress can clearly limit authorization for such orders to specific types
of assistance and to federal law enforcement investigations of certain specified
crimes, limitations by the courts cannot so easily be drawn, as our authority must
be derived from the very general All Writs Act or the even more amorphous notion
of inherent judicial power. . . .The potential dangers inherent in such a judicial
order, and the future orders it spawns, compel us to conclude that if indeed the
Government requires technical assistance, it is far better to have the authority for
ordering that assistance clearly defined by statute.
Id. at 962-63.
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the government could obtain court orders compelling assistance by
reluctant private third parties, Judge Medina stated that the deci-
sion whether a district court should have the power to issue an order
with such broad implications should be left to legislative, not judi-
cial determination." Therefore, the Second Circuit reversed that
part of the district court order which directed the telephone com-
pany to assist the federal agents in the installation and operation
of the pen register.31
Although concurring with the affirmance of the district court
order authorizing the use of the pen register, Judge Mansfield vigor-
ously dissented from that part of the opinion which held it to be an
abuse of discretion to compel telephone company assistance. 2 Find-
ing that the All Writs Act provides ample authority for a district
court to order telephone company assistance, and characterizing the
majority's foreboding as "paint[ing] imaginary and unlikely devils
on the wall, '3 Judge Mansfield asserted that a legislative mandate
is unnecessary. Believing that the determination whether assistance
is required will depend on the circumstances of each case, Judge
Mansfield concluded that the district court is better suited to make
such a decision than is Congress.34
The major difficulty encountered by the Second Circuit in In
re Pen Register was the complete absence of any statutory directives
concerning pen registers. 5 As the court noted, pen register devices
apparently are not governed by Title 1IH. Although the Supreme
30 Id.
31 Id. at 963.
22 Id. (Mansfield, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
3 Id. at 966.
31 Id. at 965. Judge Mansfield asserted that in amending Title HI, Congress did not
attempt to set forth a detailed "statutory blueprint," defining the conditions under which
assistance from communication carriers could be compelled. Rather, he remarked that Con-
gress merely granted the district courts the discretionary authority to decide whether an order
should be issued. Noting that the district courts are entrusted "with discretionary power to
issue such extraordinary relief as temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions,"
Judge Mansfield contended that there is no reason to believe that they will abuse their
discretion when formulating standards for deciding whether installation of a pen register
should be compelled under the All Writs Act. Id.
13 It has been suggested that congressional action would be the simplest method of
resolving the pen register controversy:
Ambiguity exists with respect to certain other devices which are essential to law
enforcement, but which are not now included under Title III. The Commission
[recommends] that the law with regard to such devices as the . . . "pen register"
. . . be clarified, either by amending Title mI to include them, or by revising state
and Federal rules of criminal procedure.
NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE REvIEw OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS RELATING TO WIRETAPPING AND
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, REPORT XVIII (1976) [hereinafter cited as NWC REPORT].
19771
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Court has never expressly ruled on the issue, both the legislative
history of Title ]I[31 and judicial precedent 37 support this conclusion.
Thus, faced with no statutory basis for the issuance of a pen register
order, the Second Circuit was forced to consider whether court au-
thorization is an essential prerequisite to the implementation of pen
register surveillance. Opting for the view seemingly espoused by
Justice Powell that pen registers involve a search and seizure under
the fourth amendment, the Second Circuit concluded that their use
depends upon issuance of a court order based on probable cause.38
This reliance on Justice Powell appears misplaced, however, for he
never definitively resolved the issue of fourth amendment applica-
bility. 9 Nevertheless, it is submitted that strong reasons do exist for
subjecting pen registers to the requirements of the fourth amend-
ment. In United States v. Katz, 0 the Supreme Court established the
test presently used to determine the scope of fourth amendment
protection in electronic surveillance cases. There, the Court held
that the protection of the fourth amendment applies whenever a
person maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy.4 Although
The only mention of pen registers in the sparse legislative history to Title m is in the
Senate Report. There, it was definitively stated that Title 1II is not designed to prevent the
use of the pen register. See note 15 supra. Moreover, it has been widely held that pen registers
are not governed by Title III because they do not fall within the ambit of the statute's
carefully worded definition of the term intercept. See note 4 supra.
37 See, e.g., United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809, 812 (7th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Clegg, 509 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d
478, 482 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975); United States v. Finn, 502 F.2d
938, 942 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Brick, 502 F.2d 219, 223 (8th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Best, 363 F. Supp. 11, 17 (S.D. Ga. 1973); United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp.
1033, 1039-40 (D. Md.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir.
1972), aff'd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974); United States v. Vega, 52 F.R.D. 503 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
Additionally, in United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 553 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part), Justice Powell, in an opinion in which the Chief Justice and
Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist joined, stated his belief that pen registers are not governed
by Title III.
11 538 F.2d at 959. Three other circuits have similarly relied on Justice Powell's statement
in United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 553-54 (1974), to conclude that pen registers fall
under the strictures of the fourth amendment. United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 478, 482
n.21 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975); United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co.,
531 F.2d 809, 812 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 243,
245 (8th Cir. 1976). But see United States v. Clegg, 509 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1975).
", See note 22 supra.
" 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
", In Katz, the Supreme Court stated that the fourth amendment protection attaches to
that which a person expects will remain private. Id. at 352. Subsequent clarification by
Justice Harlan, concurring in Katz, id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring), and by a plurality of
Justices in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971), has narrowed the scope of
this protection to situations where a person's expectations of privacy are reasonable. See also
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the holding in Katz is limited to the monitoring of conversations, it
is suggested that the Court's rationale is equally applicable to pen
register surveillance since quite frequently the confidentiality of
whom one calls is just as important as the secrecy of what one says.2
By deciding that a court order authorizing the use of a pen
register could be predicated upon a power analagous to that derived
from rule 41, the Second Circuit has adopted a position presently
adhered to by the two other circuits which have dealt with this
issue. 3 More significantly, the Second Circuit's reasoning appears
Fishman, The Interception of Communications Without a Court Order: Title III, Consent,
and the Expectation of Privacy, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 41 (1976).
42 See NWC HEARINGS, supra note 23, at 625 (statements of James K. O'Malley, Apr.
23, 1975); Comment, Pen Register Evidence With One-Party Consent: Should It Be
Admissible?, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 425, 433-34 (1971). Several authorities have maintained
that a reasonable expectation of privacy can never attach to the act of dialing a telephone.
These critics argue that since all telephone subscribers must use telephone company equip-
ment in order to place a call, it is unreasonable to assume that the fact a call was made will
remain a total secret. See United States v. Clegg, 509 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1975); Legal
Constraints, supra note 3, at 1042-47. This criticism is severely weakened, however, by the
fact that although telephone companies do record all toll calls for billing purposes, see DiPi-
azza v. United States, 415 F.2d 99, 101 (6th Cir. 1969), they ordinarily do not record local
numbers dialed. NWC REPORT, supra note 35, at 120. Therefore, it would seem that at least
when a person makes a local call, he may reasonably expect that the number he is dialing
will remain private. See Application of the United States for a Pen Register, 407 F. Supp.
398, 401 n.2 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (mem.); NWC REPORT, supra note 35, at 120. In fact, in In re
Pen Register, the subscriber's local calls were not recorded. Brief for United States, at 5.
It has also been suggested that pen registers are more analogous to mail covers than
wiretaps. See Legal Constraints, supra note 3, at 1046; NATIONAL COMM'N FOR REVIEW OF
FEDERAL & STATE LAWS RELATING TO WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANcE, LAW EN-
FORCEMENT EFFECTIVENESS CONFERENCE 38 (1976) (statements of G. Robert Blakey, Professor
of Law, Cornell University Law School, Aug. 6, 1974) [hereinafter NWC LAW ENFORCEMENT
EFFECTIVENESS CONFERENCE]. The post office conducts a "mail cover" by keeping a record of
all mail sent to a particular address and furnishing this information to the government. The
postal officials do not read the contents of any letter. See United States v. Balistrieri, 403
F.2d 472, 475 n.2 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 953 (1971). Clearly, this type of
surveillance is similar to that involved in the use of pen registers, which record telephone
numbers dialed on a particular telephone without monitoring the contents of any conversa-
tion. Since mail covers have been held not to violate the fourth amendment, see Lustiger v.
United States, 386 F.2d 132, 139 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968), it can be
argued that neither do pen registers. It is submitted, however, that there is a significant
difference between a mail cover and a pen register. When a person mails a letter, he knows
that the information on the envelope will pass through the hands of the postal authorities.
Therefore, he may not reasonably expect that such information will remain private. One may
analogize this to making a long distance call since it is a matter of common knowledge that
records are kept of toll calls, and thus a caller will not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy. As was previously noted, however, when a person makes a local call an expectation
of privacy can and probably does exist. The Second Circuit apparently concurred with this
logic, for the In re Pen Register court held pen register orders to be distinguishable from mail
covers. 538 F.2d at 959-60.
13 See United States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1976); United
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to be consonant with the approach taken by the Supreme Court in
a pre-Title III case, Obsorn v. United States." There, two district
court judges had jointly authorized federal agents to conceal an
electronic device on an informant for the purpose of recording the
conversations between the informant and a person suspected of
bribing a jury member. In upholding the judicially sanctioned
eavesdrop, the Court emphasized that the constitutional require-
ments had been satisfied, declaring that "[t]here could hardly be
a clearer example of 'the procedure of antecedent justification be-
fore a magistrate that is central to the Fourth Amendment.' "'I The
relevance of Osborn stems from the fact that the Supreme Court,
in unequivocal terms, sustained a court order permitting the search
and seizure of intangible property, notwithstanding that the lower
court had acted without statutory authorization." The only limita-
tion imposed by the Court was that the requisite fourth amendment
safeguards be present.47 Since the procedure followed by the district
court in In re Pen Register was similar to that approved of in
Osborn, it is suggested that the Second Circuit correctly upheld the
district court order authorizing use of the pen register. 8
States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1976). As the Seventh Circuit succinctly
stated:
IT]he commonsense approach used by the district court in issuing an order based
on probable cause and following a procedure designed to comply with Fourth
Amendment considerations in authorizing the use by the Government of the pen
register was a valid exercise of authority.
Id. at 813.
44 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
11 Id. at 330 (Stewart, J.), quoting Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 272 (Bren-
nan, J.,).
11 The Osborn Court did not concern itself with the absence of any statutory basis for
the district court order. Instead, the Court concluded that since the order was issued upon
probable cause and limited in time and scope "for the narrow and particularized purpose of
ascertaining the truth of the affidavit's allegation," it was properly granted. 385 U.S. at 329-
31; see United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 355 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57
(1967).
11 385 U.S. at 329-31. In Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), the Court noted that
although the Osborn order was not identical to a "conventional [warrant] authorizing the
seizure of tangible evidence," it afforded similar protections. Id. at 57. Similarly, in Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1967), the Court affirmatively commented that the order
in Osborn was valid even though it did not comport with the procedural requirements of rule
41. Id. at 355 n.16. For a discussion of Osborn, see Greenawalt, The Consent Problem in
Wiretapping & Eavesdropping: Surreptitious Monitoring with the Consent of a Participant
in a Conversation, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 189, 199-202 (1968).
41 It is conceivable that FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b) furnishes a district court with the author-
ity to issue a pen register order. Rule 57(b) provides: "If no procedure is specifically proscribed
by rule, the court may proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules or with
[Vol. 51:375
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Additionally, logic supports the conclusion that the Second Cir-
cuit's determination is the proper one. When Title 1HI was enacted,
it was generally believed that a court order or warrant was not a
requisite to conducting pen register surveillance." Since pen regis-
ters, "by their very nature, constitute a lesser intrusion into the
privacy of an individual than wiretaps,''5 it seems reasonable to
assume that had Congress thought pen registers would be held sub-
ject to the fourth amendment, they would have been included spe-
cifically within the ambit of Title HI. To prohibit use of the pen
register merely because of Congress' seemingly inadvertent failure
to provide adequate procedures for district court authorization of
the device would force law enforcement agents to request the greater
intrusion of a full wiretap." Certainly, Congress did not intend such
an anomalous result.
The Second Circuit's holding that the district court improperly
ordered the telephone company to assist the government in the
installation of the pen register is in direct conflict with decisions of
the Seventh and Eighth Circuits.2 Both of the other circuits, finding
that the doctrine of inherent judicial authority provides the predi-
cate for issuance of such orders, upheld challenged district court
orders without further discussion. 3 In contrast, the Second Circuit,
assuming for the sake of argument that the district court does have
the discretionary54 power to compel telephone company assistance,55
any applicable statute." As of the present, however, it appears that no court has used rule
57(b) for this purpose.
" See NWC REPORT, supra note 35, at 17. Professor G. Robert Blakey, who has been
credited with primary authorship of Title II, see United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505,
517 n.7, 526 n.16 (1974), expressed the view that "Title I does not require pen registers to
be by court order." NWC LAW ENFORCEMENT EFFE CrVENESS CONFERENCE, supra note 42, at
38.
Application of the United States for a Pen Register, 407 F. Supp. 398, 408 n.5 (W.D.
Mo. 1976) (mem.).
11 Several courts have held that a Title Im order authorizing a wiretap can simultaneously
authorize the utilization of a pen register. See note 4 supra. Even if only a wiretap is author-
ized, however, it is suggested that since the wiretap records the sound of the number being
dialed as well as the conversations, it would be relatively simple procedure for an expert to
decipher the number being called. Thus, a prohibition on the use of pen registers would
probably result in use of the greater intrusion of a wiretap to gain the same information.
52 United States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1976).
-" In deciding to direct the telephone company to assist the government, the Seventh and
Eighth Circuits simply noted that should they not exercise the power, the order authorizing
the pen register would be a nullity. United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809, 814
(7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 243, 247 (8th Cir. 1976).
1, 538 F.2d at 961. Relief under the All Writs Act is granted or withheld in the sound
discretion of the court. See Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 25-26 (1943); In re
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proceeded to carefully examine the propriety of such an order. While
noting the existence of numerous factual considerations supporting
the lower court's determination, 6 the Second Circuit found these
factors to be outweighed by the future harm such an order could
engender.17 To hold otherwise, Judge Medina posited, could estab-
Lennon, 166 U.S. 548, 556 (1897); Keco Indus., Inc. v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 1361, 1364 (D.D.C.
1970); 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2942, at 366-67 (1973).
1 It seems quite clear that the power to direct telephone company assistance is within
the province of the district court. The relief granted by the lower court in In re Pen Register
was in the nature of a mandatory injunction in that it required the telephone company to
perform an affirmative act. See Application of the United States, 427 F.2d 639, 643 (9th Cir.
1970). It is well settled that both the All Writs Act, see, e.g., Board of Educ. v. York, 429
F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971); Application of President & Direc-
tors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964),
and the doctrine of inherent authority, see, e.g., Ransburg v. American Inv. Co., 231 F.2d
333, 336 (7th Cir. 1956); ITT v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 351 F. Supp. 1153, 1208 (D.
Hawaii 1972); Johnson v. Interstate Power Co., 187 F. Supp. 36, 39 (D.S.D. 1960), provide a
federal district court with power to issue such mandatory injunctive relief.
' See note 29 supra.
See note 29 supra. Another point of disagreement leading to the conflict between the
circuits stemmed from the significance each court placed on the 1970 amendment to Title
III. This amendment provided district courts with the power to compel the telephone com-
pany to assist the government in Title I wiretap cases. See note 7 supra. As first enacted,
Title III did not contain such a provision. In 1970, the Ninth Circuit, in Application of the
United States, 427 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1970), held that federal courts, absent an express
provision in Title I, possess neither inherent authority nor authority under the All Writs
Act to issue an order directing a telephone company to aid the government. The Ninth Circuit
concluded by asserting that "[i]f the Government must have the right to compel regulated
communications carriers or others to provide such assistance, it should address its plea to
Congress." Id. at 644. Congress expeditiously amended Title I to permit a court, upon
request of the party applying for the wiretap, to direct a communications common carrier to
furnish "all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the
interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference. . . ... 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)
(1970) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (Supp. IV 1969)). The Seventh and the Eighth Circuit
decisions upholding the authority of the court to compel pen register installation viewed this
prompt action as evincing a strong congressional intent to overrule the Ninth Circuit's hold-
ing in Application. United States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 243, 246 (8th Cir.
1976); United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 1976). The Second
Circuit, however, stated in In re Pen Register that it was just as reasonable to assume that
the alacrity with which Congress acted was due to a serious doubt that courts possessed the
inherent power to issue the order in question. 538 F.2d at 962. Judge Medina reasoned that
since congressional action was necessary to provide the requisite authority in Title III cases,
similar congressional authorization should be required with regard to pen register orders. Id.
In his dissenting opinion, while not fully agreeing with either view, Judge Mansfield cau-
tioned against inferring a negative intent from such congressional action. Id. at 964-65 (Mans-
field, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Since the legislative history to the
amendment fails to shed any light on Congress' intentions, Judge Mansfield continued, there
exists little support for either conclusion. Id. at 964 n.2. It is ordinarily presumed, however,
that "an express grant of statutory powers carries with it by necessary implication authority
to use all reasonable means to make such grant effective." 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 55.02, at 381 (4th ed. C. Sands 1973). Thus, it is arguable that
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lish an unwise and dangerous "precedent for the authority of federal
courts to impress unwilling aid on private third parties."58
The anomaly implicit in Judge Medina's reasoning becomes
apparent when it is realized that the court's refusal to compel tele-
phone company assistance renders the pen register order little
"more than an empty gesture."59 Although the Second Circuit's
concern for future improper extension of governmental power over
the citizenry is praiseworthy," it is submitted that Judge Medina's
apprehension is somewhat premature. There would appear to be a
marked distinction between the telephone company in In re Pen
Register and an ordinary private citizen truly unwilling to aid the
government. The telephone company's reluctance in the case at bar
was not based on an aversion to cooperating with the government,
but rather, on its stated fear of civil or criminal liability.' Once
presented with what it is certain is a valid court order, the telpehone
company will readily comply. 2 To sanction the district court order
at the very least Congress originally intended that the district courts be empowered to direct
assistance, since without the authority Title III would be inoperative. See United States v.
Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809, 814 (7th Cir. 1976). It would therefore appear that when
faced with the Application decision, Congress was forced to legislate in an area where it had
thought the necessary power already existed. United States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
546 F.2d 243, 247 (8th Cir. 1976); accord United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809,
814 (7th Cir. 1976).
I 538 F.2d at 962. See note 28 supra.
5' 538 F.2d at 963 (Mansfield, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Courts have often denied injunctive relief where important public interests would
otherwise be prejudiced. See, e.g., Di Giovanni v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 296 U.S. 64, 73
(1935) (congressional policy that cases involving less than jurisdictional amount be left to
states); Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176, 185 (1935) (state interest paramount); Harri-
sonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 338 (1933) (need for city sewage plant).
11 Essentially, the telephone company's refusal to assist the government in installing the
pen register is based upon its fear of criminal liability under 47 U.S.C. § 501 (1970) and civil
liability under id. § 206. 538 F.2d at 960. The Second Circuit deemed this argument to be
without merit, accentuating the fact that a valid Title III court order, see note 7 supra,
provides the company with a complete defense to any action brought against it. 538 F.2d at
960. The Seventh and Eighth Circuits used identical reasoning to reject similar contentions
asserted by telephone companies. United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809, 814-
15 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 243, 246 n.6 (8th
Cir. 1976). Although Title I and its defense provisions do not govern pen register surveil-
lance, it is submitted that the analogy is persuasive. See id.
" The telephone company has stated that it does not wish to "frustrate the legitimate
needs of law enforcement," but rather, that it is fearful of exposing itself to possible civil or
criminal liability. Brief for Appellant at 8; see note 59 supra. Although the Second, Seventh,
and Eighth Circuits have all indicated that a good faith reliance on a court order will act as
a defense to any possible liability, 538 F.2d 956, 960; United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co.,
531 F.2d 809, 814-15 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d
243, 246 n.6 (8th Cir. 1976), the telephone company contends that an order requiring it to
provide assistance to the government with respect to pen registers is invalid on its face and
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"in the present case would not write a carte blanche for any and all
orders which law enforcement agencies might seek in the future."63
Were the district court confronted with a situation involving a truly
reluctant party, the issuance of injunctive relief under the All Writs
Act probably would not be justified.
Moreover the holding of the Second Circuit in In re Pen
Register would appear to be at variance with the underlying pur-
poses of Title III. Congress enacted the statute to strike a balance
between law enforcement's need for electronic surveillance in con-
trolling organized crime and the protection of individual privacy. 4
To achieve this delicate equilibrium, Title III permits limited elec-
tronic surveillance under close judicial supervision," while requiring
investigators to conduct the interception in such a way as to mini-
mize the intrusion into the privacy of the communication. 6 The
result of the In re Pen Register decision, however, is to obstruct the
government's efforts to combat organized crime while encouraging
increased invasions into individual privacy. Since pen register sur-
veillance normally cannot be implemented without telephone com-
pany assistance, the Second Circuit's holding virtually negates the
utilization of this device. If the decision is upheld, law enforcement
officials will not only be deprived of a valuable investigatory tool
but, more significantly, will be forced to seek a full wiretap in situa-
tions where a lesser intrusion on privacy would have sufficed. It
seems paradoxical that in its zeal to safeguard the privacy rights of
innocent parties, the In re Pen Register court may have contributed
to an increased intrusion into an individual's privacy.
Clearly, the sharp conflict in the circuits reflects the need for
therefore would not act as a shield to suit. Brief for Appellant at 9. The telephone company's
position may be summed up as follows: "While [the company] is protected from civil and
criminal liability if it acts in good faith reliance on a court order (18 U.S.C. § 2520), it cannot
be said to have acted in good faith if it acts on a court order which it knows is void on its
face." NWC REPORT, supra note 34, at 9. Supportive of this position is the fact that damage
actions are pending against certain of the telephone company's affiliates, even though those
companies believed that they were acting pursuant to lawful authority. Id. It should be noted,
moreover, that the National Wiretap Commission in its report to Congress stated that a
patently defective warrant would not be a defense to liability. Id.
13 538 F.2d at 965 (Mansfield, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1, S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, 70 (1968), reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2153, 2157.
'5 Id. at 66, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 2153.
" See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1970) which states: "Every order and extension thereof shall
contain a provision that the authorization to intercept. . . shall be conducted in such a way
as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception
under this chapter ....
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more definitive standards concerning pen registers. Since certiorari
has been granted in In re Pen Register, the Supreme Court now has
the opportunity to resolve the uncertainty which pervades this area.
Hopefully, the Court will set forth specific guidelines for the use of
pen registers analagous to those existing for other forms of electronic
surveillance in Title III. It is even conceivable that the Court will
reinterpret Title I[ to include these investigatory devices. Either
approach would comport with the congressional policy relating to
electronic surveillance, for it would provide a uniform framework for
the courts while protecting against indiscriminate invasions of pri-
vacy by effectively subjecting pen registers to the stringent require-
ments of Title III.
Paul S. Pearlman
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH MANDATORY NOTICE PROVISION OF TITLE III
DOES NOT WARRANT SUPPRESSION
United States v. Principie
With the enactment of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968,1 Congress established federal proce-
dures for the procurement of a court order authorizing the use of
electronic surveillance and eavesdropping by law enforcement offi-
cials. 2 In an attempt to balance the utility of electronic surveillance
as a law enforcement tool with the fourth amendment's protection
1 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
2 See id. §§ 2516-2518 (1970), which outlines procedures for obtaining court authorization
of interception and requirements for the disclosure and use of the information obtained.
Evidence procured through electronic surveillance is admissible in a federal proceeding only
if it has been obtained pursuant to Title III. Id. § 2517(3), (5). Moreover, failure to conform
to these statutory provisions may result in criminal, id. § 2511(1), or civil sanctions, id. §
2520. The civil penalties may include actual or liquidated damages, punitive damages, rea-
sonable attorney's fees, and costs.
Each state is permitted to enact its own electronic surveillance statute, which can be
more, but not less restrictive than the federal legislation. Id. § 2516(2). To date 23 states
and the District of Columbia have done so. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-187 to -189,
54-41a to -41s (1975); D.C. CODE §§ 23-541 to.-560 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:156A-1 to
-26 (West 1971 & Supp. 1976) (effective until July 1, 1978); N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW § 700.10-
.70 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1976). Many of the largest states, such as California, Pennsyl-
vania, and Texas, have not adopted wiretap legislation. California does not even permit evi-
dence lawfully seized by federal officers under a federal warrant authorizing the wiretap to
be used in state prosecutions. See People v. Jones, 30 Cal. App. 3d 852, 106 Cal. Rptr. 749
(Ct. App.), appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question, 414 U.S. 804 (1973).
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